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What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for S to know that p? We may distinguish, broadly, between a traditional and a non-traditional approach to answering this question.
False propositions cannot be known. Therefore, knowledge requires truth. A proposition S doesn't even believe can't be a proposition that S knows. Therefore, knowledge requires belief. Finally, S's being correct in believing that p might merely be a matter of luck.
Thus we arrive at a tripartite analysis of knowledge as JTB: S knows that p if and only if p is true and S is justified in believing that p. According to this analysis, the three conditions — truth, belief, and justification — are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge.
They diverge, however, as soon as we proceed to be more specific about exactly how justification is to fulfill this role.
According to TK, S's belief that p is true not merely because of luck when it is reasonable or rational, from S's own point of view, to take p to be true. According to evidentialism, what makes a belief justified in this sense is the possession of evidence. The basic idea is that a belief is justified to the degree it fits S's evidence.
NTK, on the other hand, conceives of the role of justification differently. Its job is to ensure that S's belief has a high objective probability of truth and therefore, if true, is not true merely because of luck.
One prominent idea is that this is accomplished if, and only if, a belief originates in reliable cognitive processes or faculties. This view is known as reliabilism.
There are cases of JTB that do not qualify as cases of knowledge. JTB, therefore, is not sufficient for knowledge. Cases like that — known as Gettier-cases[ 5 ] — arise because neither the possession of evidence nor origination in reliable faculties is sufficient for ensuring that a belief is not true merely because of luck.
Consider the well-known case of barn-facades: Henry drives through a rural area in which what appear to be barns are, with the exception of just one, mere barn facades. From the road Henry is driving on, these facades look exactly like real barns.
Henry happens to be looking at the one and only real barn in the area and believes that there's a barn over there.
Henry's belief is justified, according to TK, because Henry's visual experience justifies his belief. According to NTK, his belief is justified because Henry's belief originates in a reliable cognitive process: Yet Henry's belief is plausibly viewed as being true merely because of luck.
Had Henry noticed one of the barn-facades instead, he would also have believed that there's a barn over there. There is, therefore, broad agreement among epistemologists that Henry's belief does not qualify as knowledge. This is known as the Gettier problem. According to TK, solving the problem requires a fourth condition.
According to some NTK theorists, it calls for refining the concept of reliability. For example, if reliability could suitably be indexed to the subject's environment, reliabilists could say that Henry's belief is not justified because in his environment, vision is not reliable when it comes to discerning barns from barn-facades.
They would say that, if we conceive of knowledge as reliably produced true belief, there is no need for justification. Reliabilism, then, comes in two forms: As the former, it views justification to be an important ingredient of knowledge but, unlike TK, grounds justification solely in reliability.
As a theory of knowledge, reliabilism asserts that justification is not necessary for knowledge; rather, reliably produced true belief provided the notion of reliability is suitably refined to rule out Gettier cases is sufficient for it. When we discuss the nature of justification, we must distinguish between two different issues: Second, what makes beliefs justified?Published: Tue, 23 May Introduction.
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The Purdue University Online Writing Lab serves writers from around the world and the Purdue University Writing Lab helps writers on Purdue's campus. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency [Quentin Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, Alain Badiou] on plombier-nemours.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.
From the preface by Alain Badiou: It is no exaggeration to say that Quentin Meillassoux has opened up a new path in the history of philosophy. In his essay “Proof of an External World”, Moore begins by saying that there are many perfectly rigorous proof and arguments for the existence of an external world.
Proof of an External World, by G.E. Moore Essay - Skepticism is the view that there is no way to prove that objects exist outside of us. Notes on Moore’s Proof of an External World. Despite what I said in my last post about being enticed into the world of sense, reference, descriptions, rigid designators and necessary a posteriori truths, I’m beginning with scepticism after all.